Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1940

William A. Fawcett v. Security Benefit Association :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Romney, Romney and Boyer; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Fawcett v. Security Benefit Association, No. 6210 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/580

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM A. FAWCETT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 6210

SECCRITY BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah
P. C. EVANS, Judge

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

ROMNEY, ROMNEY & BOYER,
Attorneys for Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM A. FAWCETT,
Plaintiff and Respondent}

vs.

SECURITY BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, a corporation,

Case No. 6210

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
This case was tried upon an agreed statement of
facts, which is before the court. Consequently, the
parties are in harmony with respect thereto. As appellant has referred to the parties as plaintiff and defendant, we shall do likewise.
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QUESTIONS INVOLVED

The general question is whether the Benefit Certificate sued upon was in full force and effect for death
benefit only at the date of the death of Harriett P.
Fawcett, which resolves itself into the following specfie questions : ( 1) When did the extended insurance
period commence: (2) Did the endorsement placed upon the Certificate constitute a new contract between the
parties or the exercise of an option provided for in the
Certificate; ( 3) Is the plaintiff estopped to claim rights
inconsistent with the endorsement; (4) To what extent
do the laws of Kansas determine the rights of the parties in this case.

BRIEF AND ARGUMENT

Before entering into a discussion of the main points
involved, may \Ve state that we fail to see that the
method of operation of fraternal benefit societies, discussed by defendant at page 11, has any bearing upon
any of the questions in this case. The fundamental distinction between fraternal benefit societies and so-called
"old line insurance companies," is that one operates by
levying assessments to meet its obligations, and the other
uses the level premium plan. However, so far as this
case is concerned, there is no difference. The contract
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provided for the payment of a definite sum, payable
monthly for a period of twenty years. While the association had the power to levy extra assessments if occasion demanded, as in the case of White v. W.O.W.,
87, Utah 477, 50 Pac. (2d) 422, cited by defendant on
page 12, that power was not exercised during the life
of the certificate in this case. Consequently, the fact
that the term "assessments" is used rather than "premiums" or "payments" or some other like term is of no
consequence in this case. As defendant has stated on
page 15, the main question is, "What does the contract
provide?" A determination of that question, so far as
applicable here, is foreign to a discussion of the operation of fraternal benefit societies.
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I

THE EXTENDED INSURANCE PERIOD
OF TEN YEARS PLUS THIRTY DAYS COMMENCED OCTOBER 18, 1928, AND TERMINATED SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF THE
DEATH OF HARRIETT P. FAWCETT.

A. THE ASSESSMENT PAID ON FEBRUARY 18, 1922, WAS A MONTHLY ASSESSMENT, AND COVERED A PERIOD FROM
FEBRUARY 18, 1922, TO MARCH 17, 1922 INCLUSIVE. EACH ASSESSMENT THEREAFTER FELL DUE ON THE 18TH OF THE
MONTH, COMMENCING MARCH 18, 1922,
AND COVERED A FULL MONTH.
We believe defendant will agree that the theory
of extended insurance is that it covers a period in addition to the time covered by the payment of assessments. There is considerable authority for the view
that extended insurance commences at the expiration
of the grace period following the due date of the assessment not paid. See annotation in 106 A.L.R. 1276.
We believe, however, that the majority view is that in
the absence of any specific contract provision to the
contrary, extended insurance commences on the due
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date of the premium which was not paid. We have
adopted the latter proposition. It therefore becomes
material for the court to determine the due date of the
assessments under the contract, and the period covered
by each assessment.
We contend that the first assessment covered a period of one full month, and that each assessment thereafter fell due on the 18th day of each month, commencing March 18, 1922, and covered a period of one month,
and that the last assessment paid on September 30, 1928
covered a period from September 18, 1928 to October
17, 1928 inclusive. We take this position for the following reasons :

1. Wording of the contract.
The Certificate reads in part as follows:
"In consideration of the statements, answers and
agreements in the application of the member,
which by this contract are made warranties, and
in further consideration of the first monthly contribution of $2.35 paid before or at the time of
the delivery of this Certificate, and thereafter
$2.35 to be paid within each month to the Financier of the Local Council, for a completed period of twenty years from the date of the first payment thereon." (Italics ours) (Ab. 42.)

The first payment was made on February 18, 1922.
(A b. 26.) It would seem that the language of the Certificate which is italicized above requires the interpretation contended for. The first payment by the terms
of the Certificate was a "monthly" payment, the only
logical conclusion being that it covered a full month's
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period and not a portion of a month. The court will
note that such general expressions as "first monthly
contribution" and "within each month" are used in
the Certificate, and "first day of the month" and "last
day of the month" in the Constitution and Laws. (Ab.
49-50.) In addition to such general expressions, there
is the provision in the Certificate italicized above,
which requires assessments to be paid "within each
month for a completed period of twenty years from
the date of the first payment thereon." We need not
cite authority for the proposition that the court will
construe all provisions of the contract together, which
requires the general expressions to be construed along
with and in reference to the date of the first payment.
The defendant would have the court construe the general expressions without reference to the fixed date and
therefore contends that "first day of the month" and
"last day of the month" means first and last days of any
of the months of the calendar, such as March, April or
] une, etc. Defendant asks the court to adopt a construction which wholly ignores the effect of the fixed
date upon the general expressions. On the other hand,
we urge upon the court a construction which takes
into consideration the effect of the fixed date on the
general expressions. To state it another way "first and
last day of the month" as used in the Constitution and
Laws must have reference to the day of the month when
the first assessment was paid, which would necessarily
determine the day of the month when subsequent assessments fell due. The first day of the month for the payment of assessments was determined by the first payment made on the certificate to be the 18th day thereof.
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Defendant criticizes us on pages 16 and 17 for urging
that "first day of the month" means the 18th day and
"last day of the month" means the 17th day. On the
other hand, we maintain our contention is sound, and
it is the only way the general provisions can be harmonized with the fixed date. Furthermore, our contention has its counterpart elsewhere. Many corporations have their fiscal year commence on March 1st.
The first day of the fiscal year does not, therefore, correspond with the first day of the year as ordinarily understood. In the same way, the first day of the month
for the payment of assessments does not necessarily correspond with the first day of the months of the calendar.
Defendant has indicated some of the difficulties
involved with its construction. (Page 23) If the first
payment carried the Certificate down to the end of
February, 1922, and another fell due on March 1,
1922, we fail to see how the defendant can escape one
of two conclusions; namely, that the first assessment
was for term insurance to March 1, 1922, or that it
was not a monthly assessment and did not cover a full
month's period. Defendant tries to answer these objections by definitely eliminating the first, and as to
the second, by stating that the provision in the contract
to the effect that the first assessment was for the month
"in which the Certificate was delivered" meant the
month of February, 1922. To take this position, however, defendant ignores the provision in the contract
that designates the assessment as a "monthly contribution." As discussed more fully hereafter, we submit
that "monthly" means a full month's period.
If defendant's contention is correct, the 240th
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assessment would fall due on January 1, 1942, and if
not paid, would be delinquent on February 1, 1942.
To avoid a forfeiture, the 240th assessment would have
to be paid before February 1, 1942, and yet the Certificate would not mature until February 18, 1942, leaving
a gap from February 1st to February 18, 1942. Generally speaking, in insurance contracts the last premium is
paid prior to maturity, but it is uniformly true that
the maturity date of the policy and the end of the period covered by the last premium correspond, which
thy don't under defendant's construction. Defendant,
on pages 24 and 25, tries to meet this objection by saying this provision of the contract is not before the
court. The question of whether the Certificate would
be forfeited or not by the failure to pay the 241st assessment is not before the court, but the provisions of the
contract relating to the due date of assessments and the
period they covered are before the court. The reason
given by the defendant for the necessity of the language
"twenty years from the date of the first payment thereon" tends to strengthen our view, and defendant therein
admits that the date of the first payment controls so
far as subsequent payments are concerned. Defendant admits that if Mrs. Fawcett had not paid the first
assessment until April 14, 1922 (sixty days after its
date), the Certificate would not mature until April 14,
1942. However, regardless of the date of payment, the
240th payment, to adopt defendant's view, would have
to be paid before the first day of the month in which
the Certificate matured, leaving the gap mentioned
above. The above difficulties are avoided if plaintiff's
view is adopted.
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2.

Judicial interpretation.

We have made an exhaustive search and have
found no case squarely in point on the construction of a
contract similar to the one before the court. We have,
however, found two cases which adopt the theory which
supports our contention. The defendant has cited no
case against our view, nor have we been able to find
any. We shall first discuss the two cases which support
our position and then comment on the cases cited by
the defendant.
In Sovereign Camp of W. of W. v. Reed, 94 So.
910 (Ala.), the facts were as follows: The certificate
was dated December 15, 1919, the policy delivered,
and the first monthly payment of $1.60 was paid on
December 31, 1919. There was $3.20 paid on January
28, 1920 and the deceased died on the 25th of February,
1920. The certificate had the following clause:
"This certificate is granted in consideration of
the monthly premium hereinbefore stated in the
schedule and of the payment of a like amount
on or before the 1st day of each consecutive
month thereafter during the continuance of this
contract, and the further consideration of the
delivery of this certificate during the lifetime
and good health of the member."
The court stated on page 913:
"In the contract are employed the words referring to the payment of premiums, 'monthly installments,' 'following months,' and 'monthly
payment.' The word 'month' as so used in the
beneficiary certificate and exhibits thereto or
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documents incorporated therein by agreement of
the parties, had reference to a calendar month."
The court, after citing the familiar rule of construction
of a policy to be in favor of the assured, stated on page
913 as follows:
"When the contract sued upon is so construed,
and the advance payment of $1.60 as a monthly
premium on December 31, 1919 is held to be for
the calendar month to follow, no forfeiture ensued for non-payment of premiums. The receipt
book in evidence indicated a like sum on January
28, 1920, and on the same day an additional sum
of $1.60. If these payments were preperly made
to the defendant as premiums on the beneficiary
certificate the same was extended and in force to
and within the month of March." (Italics ours.)
The latter part of the above sentence which is italicized
may be dicta so .far as it says that the certificate was
in force to and within the month of March, but the first
part of the quotation is not dicta because it was one
theory on which the case was decided, as is indicated
by the court's statement on page 916:
"This (referring to the fact that the certificate
was in force at the death of the deceased) is not
only true when Sections 57 and 58-A of the constitution are considered, but is true because of
the general principle we have stated that the
term 'month' whether employed in statutes or
contracts and not appearing to have been used
in a different sense, denotes a period terminating with the day of the succeeding month numerically corresponding to the date of its beginning
less one. If there be no corresponding day of the
succeeding month, it terminates on the last day
thereof."
10
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The other case is Rybczymski v. Chicago Fraternal Life Assurance Company, 227 N.Y.S. 366. The
deceased applied for insurance on January 5, 1926. The
application was approved on January 15, 1926, and a
one year premium was paid in advance on January 27,
1926. The company issued a certificate and dated it
January 1, 1926. The certificate was not delivered, but
a request was made for a change of beneficiary. The
defendant issued a new certificate dated February 3,
1926, which was delivered. A check for the second
year's premium, dated February 2, 1927, was received
by the company on February 5, 1927, and returned.
The insured died on February 16, 1927. The certificate
provided:
"If a member elects to pay quarterly, semi-annually or annually, such payments shall be due
on the first day of the calendar month of the
quarterly, semi-annual or annual period, and
must be paid on or before the last day of the
month."
The certificate further provided:
"Should the member refuse or fail to make periodical payments at the time stipulated for such
payment ... the certificate is to be void."
Th~

court says on page 368:
"There was no time stipulated for such payment
in the benefit certificate, save as its date, February 3, 1926, be taken in connection with the
clause requiring quarterly, semi-annual or annual payments to be due on the first day of the
calendar month of the quarterly, semi-annual
or annual period, and must be paid on or before
11
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the last day of said month. That would give at
least the month of February, 1927 for the payment of the second annual premium before forfeiture. The insured died within the calendar
month of the expiration of the one year perior
of the policy." (Italics ours.}

We recognize that in neither of these cases was
the date of the death of the assured subsequent to a date ·
when the certificate would have been forfeited, under
the defendant's view, but undoubtedly the court
adopted the same theory in each case, which theory is
authority for our contention. The point we wish to
stress is that in each of the cases the court "tied in"
the general expressions to a definite date. In the Reed
case, the court tied in the general expressions to the
date December 31, 1919, and said the first premium
was "for a calendar month to follow." Under defendant's interpretation, the payment of the first premium would have covered one day only, and another
would have been due on January 1, 1920. Likewise,
in the Rybczymski case the general expressions are tied
in to the date of the policy, February 3, 1926, and "calendar month" was tied into the date of the expiration
of the one pear period of the policy. (See last italicized
portion a hove.)
As stated above, defendant has cited no authority against our contention, nor do the cases cited by
defendant support its contention because in none of
them was the question raised which is before this court,
and in none of them did the court have a contract before it which is the same as in the instant case.
The case of Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. Rhyne, 171
Miss. 687, 158 So. 472, cited by defendant on page 17,
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can be distinguished from the one at bar for the reason
that the contract provision for the payment of premiums had no reference to a fixed date.
The case of Craig v. Golden Rule Life Ins. Co.,
184 Ark. 48, 41 S.W. (2d) 769, cited by defendant on
page 18, is readily distinguishable in that the application recited the second premium would be due on November 1, 1929, and that the policy was "granted in
consideration of the application and the payment of
85 cents on or before the 1st day of October, 1929, and
a like payment on or before the 1st of each month during the calendar year and monthly payments in advance thereafter, increasing annually on January 1st of
each year in accordance with the cash savings step rate
plan."
The question of construction of the contract was
not before this court in the case of Moran v. Knights
of Columbus, 46 Utah 397, 151 Pac. 353, cited by defendant at page 19. The question there was whether
the insurance company could insist upon a forfeiture
when it had subsequently accepted payments on the
certificate. There was no qeustion of the interpretation
of the contract to determine whether a forfeiture had
occurred. If the Moran case is indicative of the "thousands of cases" referred to by defendant on page 20,
we are not surprised that defendant failed to include
more of them in its brief.
The provisions of the contract relating to due
dates of assessments and periods covered thereby are
not stated in the opinion of this court in Kennedy v.
M. W. A., 92 Utah 487, 69 Pac. (2d) 508, cited by
defendant on page 19, and no question is raised with
13
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respect to the interpretation thereof. For that reason,
anything stated by this court in that case concerning
the time when the certificate became forfeited because
of non-payment of assessments has nothing to do with
the case at bar. We agree with defendant that the books
are full of such cases as the Kennedy case, but it cannot be concluded that because the question was never
raised that the courts adopted defendant's view.
The case of Frysh v. Commercial Casualty Ins.
Co., 214 Wis. 453, 253 N.W. 184, cited by defendant
on page 22, is distinguishable for the same reason as
that pointed out in the Craig case, supra, in that the
first premium paid the policy down to a definite date,
namely, May 1, 1931. The court states in the opinion
that it was the policy of the company to have the contracts run from the first day of one month to the first
day of the next month, and that the 20th of the month
was considered to be the "dead line." The first premium in contracts issued on or before the 20th day of
the month covered a period down to the first of the next
month and premiums on policies issued after the 20th
of the month covered the period down to the first of
the second month. The insurance company in the Craig
case, supra, followed the same practice, but used the
15th day of the month as the "dead line." It will be
noted, however, in each case the contract itself provided that the first premium would pay the policy to
the first of the next or the second month, depending
upon the date of issue. It is well to note, however, that
in the contract the due date of the second premium was
fixed by a definite date and not by a general expression
such as "first day of the month." Defendant would have
the court construe the contract in this case on a par
14
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with the Craig and Frysh cases. Instead of the contract providing that the first assessment paid the certificate to the first day of a certain month, defendant's
contention must rest on general language which in turn
must be read in connection with a fixed date, which date
is not in harmony \vith defendant's interpretation of the
general language. Clearly, then, the Frysh and Craig
cases are not helpful to defendant.
3.

Calendar month.

Defendant relies on the quotation from Warfield
Natural Gas Co. v. Clark, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S.W. (2d)
21, 97 A.L.R. 971, for the meaning of the expression
"calendar month." The question in the Warfield case
was whether the gas company had wrongfully turned
off the gas in the plaintiff's home. On the back of the
application was the following:
"3. The amount payable for the gas furnished
during each month shall be due on the first day .
of the following month and unless paid on or
before the 15th of such month the gas will be
shut off without further notice. In the event
service is discontinued during any month the
amount payable shall be due immediately upon
such discontinuance."
Within four or five days after January 11, 1933, the
company rendered Mrs. Clark a bill for gas furnished
from December 9, 1932 to January 10, 1933, which had
on it the statement, "Last day to pay net amount January 26, 1933." The bill was not paid and the gas was
shut off on February 6, 1933. Apparently it was the
gas company's contention that they had the right under
the quoted portion of the contract above to shut the gas
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off if the bill remained unpaid for fifteen days from the
"first day of the following month," meaning that the fol·lowing month started on the day following the monthly
period for which a bill was rendered for gas furnished.
The court gave the definition of the words "calendar
month" as given in Webster's New International Dictionary,
" ( 1) any of the months as adjusted in the calendar, now the Gregorian. April, June, September and November now contain 30 days, and
the rest 31, except February, which has 28, and,
in leap years, 29. (2) The time from any day
of such a month to the corresponding day (if
any; if not, to the last day) of the next month."
The court in the Warfield case adopted the first construction. The case, however, is readily distinguished
from the one at bar. In the Warfield case the contract
provisions "on the first day of the following month"
and "on or before the 15th of such month" do not have
reference to and are not connected with any particular
month or day of a particular month for the time of
commencement. On the other hand, when "calendar
month" is used in connection with a contract of insurance and is tied into a fixed date, as was the case in
Shira v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed (2d) 953, cited
by defendant on page 21, Webster's second meaning of
"calendar month" is adopted.
The provision in the contract for payment of premiums was as follows:
"This contract is made in consideration of the
application therefor, and of the payment in ad-
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vance of the sum of $78.40, the receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged, constituting the first
premium and maintaining this policy for the
period terminating on the second day of April,
Nineteen Hundred and Thirty, and of a like sum
on said date and every three calendar months
thereafter during the life of the Insured."
The court said on page 9 56:
"The contract expressly provided that the initial
premium would cover a period terminating on
April 2, 1930, and that the insured should pay
a like premium every three calendar months
thereafter to maintain the policy."
There is no question as to the meaning of the phrase
"every three calendar months thereafter" as the court
said on page 955: "Insured failed to pay the premium ·
due April 2, 1933." In other words, "three calendar
months thereafter," when tied to a definite date as in
the Shira case, meant on the date corresponding to the.
fixed date every three months, which would be the 2nd
day of July, October and January of each year, whereas
defendant's interpretation would require the uncalled
for construction that premiums fell due on the first day
qf July, October, January and April thereafter. The
same interpretation is used in many cases where a fixed
date is involved.
Thus, in Shea v. Graves, 19 Pac. (2d) 406, (Ore.),
it was held that a complaint to foreclose a mechanic's
lien filed on November 2, 1938, was filed within six
months from May 2, 1938, the date of the filing of the
lien, and in Hayward Lumber & Investment Co. v.
Corbett, 33 Pac. (2d) 41 (Calif.), the court held that
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a notice of default dated April 18, 1929, was premature
under a trust providing that the trust should be in default for three months before the whole amount of the
obligation would become due and payable, where the
first default was February 1, 1929. The notice could
not be effective if dated before May 1, 1929. The following is a quotation from Langley v. State, 155 So.
682, (Miss.) :
"The term 'month' when used in any statute
means a calendar month unless a contrary intention be expressed . . . in computing which
time must be reckoned by looking at the calendar and not by counting days, and when not
coincident with the particular month named in
the calendar, such a month is the period of time
from the day from which the month is to be
computed to the day numerically corresponding
thereto in the following month less one, if the
following_ month has so many days; if not, to the
last day thereof."
The Alabama court, in the recent case of Daniel
v. Ormand, 163 So. 361 (Ala.), still uses the same interpretation of the phrase . "calendar month" as was
used in Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. v. Reed, 94, So.
910, which defendant criticizes on page 26. The court
says in the Daniel case:
"With us, the word 'month,' unless otherwise expressed, means a 'calendar month,' Code 1928,
Para. 9, Sov. Camp W.O.W. v. Reed, 208 Ala.
457, 94 So. 910, which according to Webster's
New International Dictionary means the time
from any day of any of the months as adjusted
in the calendar to the corresponding day (if any;
if not, to the last day) of the next month."
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The case which best illustrates the importance of
the meaning of calendar month as tied to a specific
date which we have been able to find, is Schissler v.
Wisconsin Life Ins. Co., 202 N.W. 177 (Wis.). The
plaintiff had a contract with the defendant giving him
exclusive right to sell insurance in a certain area, with
certain provisions of cancellation, one of which was
that defendant could cancel the contract if plaintiff
failed for two consecutive months to produce any accepted and paid for business. The plaintiff failed from
January 4, to March 15, 1917 to produce any applications for insurance, and defendant exercised its privilege of cancellation. Quoting from the opinion:
"Such period, however, it is contended by plaintiff, was not the 'two consecutive months' under
Clause 15 quoted above, for the reason, as it is
argued, that in the absence of a more specific
designation the months must be calendar months
and be computed as starting on the first day of
some month immediately following in which, at
any time therein, business had been produced,
and that therefore, the applications of January
4th prevented the commencement of the period
of two consecutive months until the first of February, and there having been an application produced in March there was but one instead of
two calendar months intervening the January
4th and March 17th applications. Reliance' is
placed upon Section 4971 ( 10) Statutes, providing that the word 'month' shall be construed
to mean a calendar month unless otherwise expressed. This, however, does not determine the
time for commencement of a period computed
in calendar rather than lunar months. This statute also provides that where the word year is
used it means a calendar year. The contract in
19
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question was made December 3, 1914, and clearly, the yearly period referred to in the contract
within which a specified amount of business was
required to be produced in order that plaintiffs
might preserve their exclusive territory would
expire on the 4th of December of each year
thereafter rather than merely starting on the
first of January following. By the same reasoning, the expressions here involved should be
computed as the period of two calendar months
from the day upon which any particular insurance business was produced. More than such
period had clearly expired at the time of the
obtaining of the policy on March 17th." (Italics
ours.)
4.

Construction of By-Laws and

Certificate~

Without reiterating again the provisions of the
By-Laws and ~ertificate with reference to due dates
of assesments, etc., may we state that the wording of the
By-Laws standing alone and apart from the Certificate
tends to support defendant's contention, and likewise,
we maintain there is little or no question about our position based upon the wording of the Certificate alone.
How then shall the court construe the contract? It is
elementary that the court will construe the entire contract and harmonize the provisions contained therein
if possible. This can be done only if "first day" and
"last day" of the month, as used in the Laws, are considered in connection with the date when the first assessment was paid as used in the Certificate, thus making the first day of the month the 18th and the last day
the 17th of the next month, commencing February 18,
1922, and continuing for twenty years thereafter.
It is only when the contention of the defendant is
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urged that ambiguity exists. There is no way that ambiguity can be avoided if "first" and "last" day of
the month, as used in the Laws, refers to the first and
last day of March, April or JY1ay, etc., when considered
in connection with the wording of the certificate.
However, if there is ambiguity between the Laws
and the Certificate, there is ample authority holding
that the wording of the Certificate controls. The following cases hold that where there is a conflict between
the By-Laws and the policy, the policy will prevail
over the By-La\vs: Masson v. Woodmen of Union
(Ark.), 262 S.W. 648; Greenlaw v. Aroostook County
P.M. F. (Maine), 105 Atl. 116; Faileyv. Fee (Md.),
34 Atl. 839; Davidson v. Old People, etc. (Minn.) 39
N.W. 803; Eminent Household v. Bunch (Miss.), 76
So. 540; Courtney v. Fidelity Mutual Aid Society
(Missouri), 94 S.W. 768.
A very recent case from Kansas, the state of the
incorporation of the defendant company, is that of
Lawson v. Brotherhood of American Y oemen, 25 P.
(2d) 344, which holds:
"Where the contract consists of the by-laws, the
certificate, and certain other documents, all
should be considered. They should be construed
together. If there is inconsistency in them when
so considered, the court will, when interpretation is possible, so construe them as to give the
insured the benefit of provisions favorable to
him." Quoting several cases.
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of Maynard v. Locomotive Engineer's Mutual Life, 16 Utah
145, 51 P. 259, has held substantially the same thing.
The court says on page 260:
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"The terms of the by-laws in question must be
interpreted liberally and reasonably, and, as they
appear to be susceptible of two constructions,
that must be adopted which will more nearly
carry out the benign object of the association and
sustain the claim of the insured. The provisions
will not be scrutinized for the purpose of enabling the organization to escape liability to
any of its members, or for the purpose of creating limitations in favor of the association which
do not satisfactorily appear within the terms of
the by-laws. Where associations or corporations
are organized for the purpose of mutual benefit and relief, their by-laws will not be so interpreted as to favor the forfeiture of the rights
of its members."
When plaintiff's view is adopted, there is no ambiguity in the contract, but if defendant's view is accepted, ambiguity cannot be avoided. If there is ambiguity, the wording of the Certificate controls and the
construction most favorable to the insured must be
adopted. In either event, the court should affirm the
decision of the lower court for the plaintiff.

5.

First monthly contribution.

The Certificate was issued in consideration "of the
first monthly contribution .... " We contend that the
first assessment covered a period of one full month
from the time it was paid. We recognize the general
rule, as stated by the defendant on page 13, that the
parties to an insurance contract may agree that future
premiums shall be paid on certain dates in spite of the
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fact that the first premium may not cover a full month
or a full year. The corollary of this statement is also
true. In the absence of contract providing otherwise,
the assessment which is called a "monthly" assessment
must be held to cover a full month. The question, of
course, arises whether or not there is a provision in
the contract requiring the second assessment to be paid
short of one month from the date of the payment of the
first assessment. Without again repeating what has
heretofore been said about definite fixed dates and general provisions, we maintain that there is no such contract provision before the court in this case.
However, in the case of Kennedy v. National Accident & Health Ins. Co., 76, S.W. (2d) 748 (Mo.),
even in the face of a provision in the policy limiting
payment of the first premium which was paid on July
lOth, to August 1st, the court refused to hold that it did
not cover a full month. The court said:
"The initial premium paid on July 1Oth upon
delivery of the policy was described in the policy
itself as a monthly premium, so that from the
very beginning the policy was a monthly premium payment policy, which carried it, in accordance with the conclusions above announced,
from the date of its delivery for one month."
{Italics ours.)
And likewise, in the case of Jefferson Standard Life
Insurance Company v. Myers, 284 S.W. 216 (Texas),
the court said:
"In other words, the company, 1n the absence
of a contract to the contrary, has no right to
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collect a premium for almost a month before the
insured has any protection under the policy.
The premium is for a year."
6. Assessments fell due on the monthly date corresponding to the effective date of the Certificate.
The Certificate did not become effective until the
first assessment was paid and the Certificate delivered
and signed by the applicant during her good health,
which date was February 18, 1922. (Ab. 46, 49.) There
is considerable authority for the proposition that when
the policy does not become effective until delivery, subsequent premiums shall fall due on dates corresponding
to the effective date of the policy. See annotations in 6
A.L.R. 774; 32 A.L.R. 1253; 80 A.L.R. 957; and 111
A.L.R. 1420. We recognize that the cases so holding
seem to be in the minority where the parties have contracted that subsequent premiums shall fall due on
definite dates which do not correspond with the effective date. Granti'ng the majority view to be as stated,
we have found no cases so holding unless the contract
definitely fixed the date for the payment of subsequent
premiums other than to corresponding with the effective date. We maintain there is no definite date fixed
in the contract before the court requiring the payment
of subsequent assesments, other than to correspond with
the first, which is the effective date of the certificate.
In the absence of the fixing of such a date by the contract, the cases cited in the A.L.R. annotations above,
which appear to be in the minority so far as the proposition there annotated is concerned, undoubtedly are
good authority for the contention we make herein.
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B.

HARRIETT P. FAWCETT WAS EN-

TITLED TO EXTENDED INSURANCE COMMENCING ON A DATE CORRESPONDING
TO THE DATE TO WHICH ASSESSMENTS
WERE PAID AS DETERMINED BY THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE CERTIFICATE,
WHICH WAS FEBRUARY 18, 1922.
Authority for the above statement is the recent
case of Harvey v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 45 Fed.
(2d) 78. The application was dated October 22, 1918,
and was approved November 7, 1918. The policy was
dated November 9, 1918, and provided for the payment
of an annual premium on October 22nd of each year.
The policy provided that the insurance became effective
on the date of the approval of the application. There
was a provision for extended insurance wh~ch, according to the amount on hand at the time of default in
payment of premiums, covered a period of two hundred thirty-seven days. The insurance company figured the extended insurance from October 22, 1928 to
June 16, 1929. The insured died on June 25, 1929. The
beneficiary contended the extended insurance should
have been figured from November 7, 1928, the anniversary of the date of the approval of the application,
and which would have included the date of the death
of the deceased. The court held that the extended insurance should have been figured from the anniversary
of the effective date of the policy and not from the the
anniversary of the date provided for the payment of
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premiums. The following excerpts from the opinion
are enlightening. The court says in the first column
on page 81:
"Three separate dates are mentioned in the policy. October 22 is definitely fixed as the date
upon which annual premiums must be paid in
advance. It was agreed, however, that the policy should not become effective until the application was approved by the company and the
date of such approval is November 7. The policy itself was not signed by the company nor
dated until November 9. The result of the agreement between the parties was to require the insured to prepay his premiums sixteen days before receiving any benefit therefrom. It was an
apparently somewhat insignificant and perhaps
unforeseen hardship to which he became bound.
In the matter of lapse it might have been serious, and if appellee's contention is correct, it
results in the tragedy of forfeiture."
and further states in the second column on page 81 :
"There can be no doubt under the decisions that
the requirement to pay premiums annually in
advance on October 22 was a valid and binding
agreement. The minds of the parties definitely
met upon that point, and there is nothing in the
record to indicate that the insured was in any
way misled. Failure to pay any annual premiu-m
on that date resulted, after thirty days' grace,
in lapse. This only meant, however, that thereafter the insured had forfeited his right to keep
the policy alive by subsequent payment of premiums. To restore such right required reinstatement under the rules and regulations of the company. Such lapse, however, in no way avoided
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his right to extended insurance if entitled thereto
under the other conditions of the policy."
The court further states in the first column on page 82:
"A review of the numerous authorities cited in
appellee's brief will disclose no case, nor do
we think any can be found, of persuasive force,
in which the mere provision for payment of premiums in advance was construed to overcome
the plain provisions of a policy that it should
take effect on a subsequent date. ·Had the parties agreed that the policy should not become
effective until approved but that if and when
approved the insurance year should run from
October 22, appellee's contention would be sustained by the weight of authority. It has been
held in numerous cases that where the effective
date of a policy is agreed upon as the beginning
of the policy year, such date must govern though
the premium may not have been paid until a
later date nor the policy delivered until such
time."
and further in the second column on page 82:
"A reference to the policy will clearly show that
the date, October 22, related only to the day for
paying premiums. In providing for incontestability, article 21 of the policy provides that it
shall be incontestable after one year 'from date
of issue, except for non-payment of premium,'
and certainly the policy was not issued until the
application was approved by the company. In
article 25 it is provided that the policy shall be
avoided by the suicide of the insured 'within one
year.' We cannot conceive of the company's asserting that this limited the time to one year
from: the date of the application and the date
of the payment of premium. The expression
'policy year' or 'end of policy year' is mentioned
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no less than three times in the policy, and there
also appears the expression 'on the anniversary
of the policy.' This evidently refers to the anniversary of the birth of the policy which occurred on the approval of the application. It is
true that option 1, article 14, of the policy states
that the reserve value shall be applied to the
extension of this policy as participating term in:
surance 'from the date to which premiums have
been paid.' It does not state, however, that this
shall be from the date on which premiums are
paid or are required to be paid. Subscriptions
to newspapers and periodicals are frequently required to be paid in advance, but when an annual
subscription is thus paid, it is paid to the anniversary date from which the subscription begins to
run and not from the date on which payment was
made. The same is frequently applied to other
business organizations, social clubs, etc. Where
dues are paid in advance, they are universally
recognized as covering the period from which
the privilege, for which payment is made, begins
to run and not from the date of payment itself.
We think it clear, therefore, that the date to
which premiums were paid as provided in the
policy was the end of the policy year from which
the insurance became effective." (Italics ours.)

We think the Harvey case goes farther than is necessary
to sustain our position. In the Harvey case there was
a definite date in the policy for payment of the second
and subsequent premiums short of one year from the
effective date, which is not true in the case at ba.r. Even
if defendant's view that the second assessment fell due
on March 1, 1922 be adopted, the Harvey case is authority for the proposition that extended insurance shall
be figured from the date premiums are paid to as determined by the effective date of the policy. As stated in
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the Harvey case, the date October 22nd related only
to payment of premiums. But all the other rights of
the parties, such as incontestability, suicide clause, etc.,
were determined from "date of issue." Likewise, in
the case at bar the rights of the parties, even including
the date for payment of premiums, are determined with
reference to the effective date of the certificate, as is
indicated by the following excerpts from the Certificate and the Laws :
"(5) This Certificate shall not take effect until
all required assessments have been paid and the
Certificate signed by the applicant in person,
and during the applicant's good health." (Ab.
46.)
Sections 96 and 98 (Exhibit No.3, pages 45, 46) read
in part as follows :
"Sec. 96: . . . . such Beneficiary Certificate
shall not become effective until manually delivered to the applicant while the applicant is
in good health and the assessment and dues, for
the month in which the Certificate is delivered,
have been paid and said Beneficiary Certificate
signed by the applicant while in good health,
nor unless delivered within sixty days after the
date thereof."
"Sec. 98: When Certificate in Force. The Beneficiary Certificate shall become effective and
be in force from and after the initiation of the
member and the payment of one assessment and
Subordinate Council dues to the Financier, the
Certificate having been signed by the member
and delivered to him while in good health."
We think the wording of the last part of the ex-
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cerpt from the second column of page 82 in the Harvey
case is very significant as applied to our case. The defendant urges it is good business policy for insurance
companies to have definite dates for payment of assessments, and that therefore, first day of the month as used
in the Laws means the first day of March, etc. Granting
this to be true, it does not alter the right of the insured
to extend insurance, according to the Harvey case. In
other words, for the convenience of the company in
having a definite date for payment of assessments, it
may be necessary, in order to avoid a forfeiture, for the
insured to pay assessments on or before the last day of
each month of the calendar. But as stated in the Harvey
case, the payment may be required to be made in advance, but covers a period beyond the time when the
next falls due. Therefore, taking defendant's contention as to the due date of assessments to mean that the
last one paid fell due on September 1, 1928, and had
to be paid on or before the last day of September, 1928,
still under the Harvey case it covered a period from
September 18, 1928 to October 17, 1928, inclusive, and
extended insurance should have been figured from that
time.
We do not believe the above construction necessary
to our case for the reasons stated herein. But such a
construction is essentially fair to both parties. It gives
effect to the definiteness of the date for payment of
assessments desired by the insurance company, and at
the same time gives the insured the benefit of a full
month's insurance for each assessment. If the insured
is to get one full month's insurance for each assessment,
this can be accomplished with the construction suggested in the Harvey case.
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II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
COURT OF THE CONSTRl1CTION THE PARTIES PLACED ON THE CONTRACT.
To adopt the rule contended for by defendant on
page 31, there must be some evidence of the construction the parties placed on the contract. In the case of
Scotten v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 724,
81 S.W. (2d) 313, cited by defendant on page 31, the
court held that the interpretation the insured had
adopted must control. However, there could be no
question as to his interpretation as he had requested
the payment of premiums as of April 15th and had
paid premiums on the basis that April 15th was the due
date for several years, and had signed an application
for reinstatement upon two occasions on the basis that
he had not paid the premium which fell due on April
15th. What evidence is there in this case that Harriett
P. Fawcett ever adopted the defendant's construction?
The date of the last payment, September 30, 1928, is
just as consistent with plaintiff's view as with that of
defendant. Defendant urges that the assured adopted
its view when she retained the Certificate with the endorsement on it for over ten years without objection.
No weight can be attached to the fact that the assured
retained the Certificate with the endorsement on it without objection for the reason that such fact does not go
to show what her interpretation of the contract was
with reference to the payment of assessments. The contract in no place states the date or time from which
extended insurance shall be figured. There is nothing
in the application for extended insurance or the en31
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dorsement which attempts to tie the date of its commencement with the date for payment of assessments.
The books are full of litigation as to when the period
of extended insurance begins. We have adopted in this
case what we consider to be the majority rule, that in
the absence of a contract provision to the contrary the
extended insurance begins to run on the due date of
the premium which was not paid. Other courts have
held that it starts at the end of the grace period, which
rule, if adopted by this court would permit recovery
by plaintiff under defendant's theory. See annotation
entitled, "Due Date of Premium or Date of Expiration of Grace Period as Commencement of Period of
Extended Insurance," 106 A.L.R. 1276. A third possibility is found in the Harvey case, supra, and there
are others. If the contract had contained a provision
that extended insurance was to commence on the due
date of the assesment which was not paid, or some similar provision, there might be some basis for defendant's contention, but in view of the fact that the highest courts of the land are not in harmony on the subject
of the time of commencement of extended insurance
and some courts hold that its commencement is not
necessarily connected with the due date of premiums,
no significance can be attached to the fact that Mrs.
Fawcett failed to object to the terms of the endorsement so far as such fact is related to her interpretation
of the contract as to the due dates of assessments.
We refer the court to our discussion on the heading of estoppel herein for the futility of objection by
the assured if she did not adopt defendant's construction. Her failure to object is of no consequence by way
of evidence of her interpretation of the contract.
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III
THE ENDORSEMENT ON THE CERTIFICATE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A NEW CONTRACT.
We contend that the right to extended insurance
existed in the Certificate itself, and that after the required number of assessments were paid the assured
was entitled, as a matter of right, by filing a written
application, to extended insurance for the period stated
in the table of values in the Certificate. Making written application for extended insurance was the exercise
by the assured of one of the options granted to her
in the Certificate. The only contract provision for extended insurance is in the Certificate as follows:
"VI. The Security Benefit Association promises
to Waive periodical contributions hereinbefore
stipulated and to continue protection for death
benefit only to the said member in the amount
of the face of this Certificate during such period
as its withdrawal equity, taken as a single premium, will purchase as temporary protection;
provided the member has made the stipulated
periodical contributions without default for not
less than three years prior to the application for
this privilege, and has maintained his status as
a member as required and presscribed in the
Constitution and Laws of the Association." (Ab.
44.)
The application for extended insurance, a form furnished by the company, reads in part as follows:
"I desire to exercise my option to discontinue
beneficiary contributions . . . . and I desire to
change beneficiary certificate No. 911864, dated
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February 14, 1922, for $1000.00 to continued or
extended whole life protection, for death benefit only .... " (Ab. 51, 52.)
The right to extended insurance accrued upon
application made by virtue of the terms of the Certificate itself, apart from and independent of the endorsement. The endorsement was not necessary to the creation of the right. Indeed no. act on the part of the
company was necessary to create such right, but merely
the election of the assured by filing an application. The
right was inchoate at the issuance of the Certificate
and became vested when application was filed, and the
endorsement itself is merely an attempt to state the
period covered by the extended insurance, and does
not amount to a ne\v contract.
It is well to note that the application states as
follows:
"At the expiration of which time the Certificate
shall be void and cancelled by expiry." (Ab. 52.)
and the endorsement says:
"As part of the consideration for this extention
the said Harriett P. Fawcett agrees to surrender
this Certificate for cancellation after the expiration thereof as above described." (Ab. 27.)
indicating definitely that is was intended that the Certificate should be in force as modified by the option,
until the expiration of the extended insurance period.
Clearly, if the transaction was a new contract, the Certificate would have been surrendered at the time and
not at the expiration of the extended insurance period.
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It is well to note also in this connection, that in
her application Harriett P. Fawcett asks for extended
insurance for ten years and thirty days, but it does not
state from any definite time.
We have been fortunate In finding an excellent
case on this point. In New York Life Insurance Company v. Gilbert, a Missouri case decided in 1923, and
reported in 256 S.W. 148, this question is discussed.
The facts of the case are as follows: The insured had a
loan on his policy. He had discontinued payment of
premiums. He wrote to the company on December
4, 1920, and asked how much paid up insurance he
could get after cancellation of the loan. The company
wrote back stating he would have paid up insurance
for $768.00. The company later found it had made a
mistake and that the policy was good for only $296.00
in paid up insurance. An endorsement was made on the
policy showing it was worth $768.00 in paid up insurance, and the policy with the endorsement was forwarded to the insured. The mistake was discovered
about a year later. The court held that the company
was entitled to have the endorsement reformed to correspond to the true amount. The question of option or
new contract was involved. The court stated on page
150:
"It would seem that the determinative question
in this case is: Was it intended to settle in accordance with the terms of a previous contract
or agreement, or was it intended to settle upon
an greement outside of the terms of the policy,
showing an intention to extinguish the old con-
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tract and make a new one? It seems quite evident to us that it was the insured's intention to
settle under the terms of the policy when he
wrote his letter of December 4, 1920. In this
letter he inquired as to how much paid up insurance he could get. In the first place, the letter
assumed that he was entitled to paid up insurance, which assumption could only be referable
to the policy provisions. The amount of paid
up insurance was not to be an arbitrary sum,
but was to be 'figured' so clearly that the insured
could understand it. This assumes that is was
to be figured upon some basis, and under the
circumstances then existing it could have had
reference to nothing but the provisions of the
policy, which is mentioned by number in the
letter. It is quite apparent from all the facts
that the agreement between plaintiff and the insured was that the settlement was to be made
in accordance with the terms of an existing contract or policy; that it was not to be a new contract wholly outside the terms of the old one,
or, in other words, a substitution of a new contract for the old one; but that it was to be merely
a continuation of the old contract under an option in favor of the insured that was provided
for in it."
See also the following cases: New York Life Insurance Co. v. Kimball, 106 Atl. 676 (Vt.); Alabama Gold
Life Insurance Co. v. Thomas, 74 Ala. 578; Holman
v. Continental Life Insurance Co., (Conn.), 6 Atl. 405;
People v. Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co., (New
York), 9. N.E. 35.
Defendant urges that Harriett P. Fawcett was not
entitled, as a matter of right, to extended insurance for
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the reason that her application therefor was not made
while she was in good standing. No such requirement
is to be found in Option VI of the contract. It is apparent that the wording,
"And has maintained his status as a member as
required and prescribed in the Constitution and
Laws of the association."
refers to and must be read in connection with the three
year period mentioned immediately preceding it. In
other words, before the right to extended insurance accrued, the insured must have made the periodical contributions without default and "maintained his status
as a member as required and prescribed in the Constitution and Laws of the association" for a period of
three years before making application. Does the three
year period mean immediately preceding the making
of the application, or does it mean subsequent to the
date payments began. Clearly it means the latter for
the reason given in Kennedy v. M.W.A., 92 Utah 487,
69 Pac. (2d) 508, cited by defendant on page 36. The
court, after referring to conditions precedent to the
application for extended insurance, says at the top of
the second column on page 510 of 69 Pac. (2d) :"The first condition clearly contemplates at
least thirty-six consecutive monthly payments
without any interruption. This is necessary in
order that the proper reserve be built up to carry
the extended insurance."
The wording of the certificate in the Kennedy case
was as follows:
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"If all payments by the member have been regularly made in full for three or more full years,
then upon written request of the member, on
forms to be furnished by the head clerk of the
society, while this benefit certificate is in full
force, the society will extend, etc." (Italics ours.)
The conclusion that the provision in the contract before
the court is equivalent to a statement that the application must be made while the certificate is in full
force, as in the Kennedy case, is unwarranted.
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IV
PLAINTIFF

IS

NOT

ESTOPPED

TO

CLAIM RIGHTS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
ENDORSEMENT.
If the length of defendant's argument on this subject is indicative of the weight attached thereto, little
need be said in answer. There is no basis for estoppel.
The defendant has not been led to act differently or
do anything, or fail to do anything, it would not otherwise have done, in reliance on Mrs. Fawcett's failure
to object to the terms of the endorsement. In order
for the date of the endorsement to have made any difference Mrs. Fawcett would have to have contemplated
dying between October 31, 1938 and November 16,
1938. If she died before October 31, 1938, she would
be protected under the terms of the endorsement. If
she died after November 16, 1938, she would have
been precluded from recovery. It seems wholly unwarranted for the defendant to conclude that because she failed to make objection to the date contained in the endorsement, when there was such a remote chance of it making any difference, that by her
failure to object she adopted it as her construction of
the contract, or that her beneficiary should now be estopped to claim rights under the certificate inconsistent with the endorsement. In other words, under the
circumstances of this case, her having retained the certificate with the endorsement without objection is no
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"'

evidence at all of the construction she placed on the
contract. Without lengthening this brief further, if
the court is interested in this point it is fully discussed
in a well written opinion by the late Justice McDermott, in the case of Columbian National Life v. Black,
35 F. (2d), 571.
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v
THE LAWS OF KANSAS HAVE NOT DETERMINED THE QUESTION BEFORE THE
COURT.
The case of Wolford, Administratrix, v. National
Life Ins. Co., 114 Kan. 411, 219 Pac. 263, cited by
defendant on pages 14 and 38, and so strongly relied
upon by defendant, does not decide the question before
the court. We have heretofore stated that subject to
the exceptions in I-A-5 herein, the majority view seems
to be that the parties to an insurance contract have the
right to contract that the second premium shall become due on a date cetrain which is short of a month
or year from the date the insurance became effective.
The insurance in the Wolford case was granted in consideration of an advance payment of $227.70, terminating on Nevember 14, 1918, and of the payment of annual renewals on or before the 14th day of November
thereafter. The Wolford case is subject to the same
criticism as the other cases cited by defendant in this
connection, in that defendant attempts to use a case
involving a specific date as authority for its contention
in the case at bar where only general language is used.
For defendant to contend that its contention is upheld
by the Wolford case begs the whole question of this
law suit.
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CONCLUSION
We have attempted in the foregoing argument to
discuss the several points raised by the defendant on
their merits, and also to state our own contentions and
authorities in support thereof.
By way of conclusion, may we add that it is not
the disposition of courts to read more into an insurance contract than is found there, especially when to
do so would result in a forfeiture and limitation of
the rights of the insured. Defendant cannot rely on
strictness of adjudication unless the contract contains
strict provisions therefor, as is borne out by the following statement from the court in Sovereign Camp v.
Rhyne, 158 So. 472, cited by defendant on page 17 of
its brief:
"When a party relies upon a time provision in·
a contract as being the essence of that contract,
it is no more than just that when he thus calls
for strictness in adjudication, he should show
that he has been as definite and certain in his
contract stipulations in respect to the time relied
upon as he is in the strictness to which he seeks
to hold the other party in relation thereto."
We sincerely maintain that the court should affirm
the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY, ROMNEY & BOYER,

Attorneys for Respondent
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